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1   Introduction 
We report on an approach to the management of the 
interplay between the safety and security processes, 
currently studied in a recently started collaborative 
European project, AQUAS (Aggregated Quality 
Assurance for Systems, http://aquas-project.eu/). AQUAS 
is experimenting with co-ordinating these processes 
through "interaction points", which will be introduced 
below, via a set of case studies or "demonstrators". It is 
motivated by the problems found by industry in 
combining in a cost-effective way the tasks of ensuring 
satisfaction of various non-functional requirements 
(where "ensuring" means "achieving and demonstrating"). 
 Most such problems have been reported with the task of 
ensuring both safety and security in embedded systems. 
Companies with established processes for ensuring safety 
would import processes for ensuring security as well, but 
problems may arise because on the one hand, the two 
need to be considered together (e.g. because security 
violations affect safety, and because design trade-offs 
may arise between these two sets of goals), but on the 
other hand, they are the preserves of different technical 
cultures with their own languages, habitual assumptions 
in their analyses, etc. It is sometimes said, deprecatingly, 
that these specialists of different cultures work in "silos", 
with information flowing vertically within a specialism 
but not across specialisms. As the SAE J3061 
Cybersecurity Guidebook has noted: “A tightly integrated 
process for Cybersecurity and safety has the advantage of 
a common resource set, thus, requiring fewer additional 
resources. However, since both activities require different 
technical expertise and both activities are resource 
intensive, it may not be feasible to expect a single team of 
experts to have the skills to perform both Cybersecurity 
and safety tasks simultaneously.” It is for this reason that 
the Guidebook, while recognizing the advantages of the 
ideal integrated process, makes provisions for non-
integrated safety and security processes that communicate 
in more or less well-defined ways – what in AQUAS we 
call interaction points (Figure 1). 
We call "interaction point" both an activity and the point 
in a product life cycle (PLC) at which it occurs. The 
activity is "interaction" in that (a) experts in the various 
aspects of the system and its properties interact., e.g. 
security and safety experts; (b) their analyses are 
combined in some way, that may be anywhere in the 
range from informal discussion and mutual critique to 
using mathematical models to assess various measures of 
interest for alternative design options, or even a single, 
summary measure to be optimised (e.g., probability of an 
undesired event); (c) the need for changes or decisions 
may be recognised that require an integrated view, e.g. 
because of inevitable trade-offs between desirable 
properties, and these trade-offs are discussed between the 
various experts to produce recommendations/decisions, 
possibly with the aid of the above-mentioned 
mathematical models. 
2   Static versus dynamic interaction 
points 
An important question is when these interactions should 
take place, to be cost-effective for a given project in a 
given company. One viewpoint is that the lifecycle model 
used by the developers should identify from the beginning 
when interaction points will be needed. These "statically 
scheduled" interaction points are so scheduled as to 
achieve a reasonable trade-off between 
 The cost of too many interactions for those "lucky" 
projects that never have conflicts or resulting rework 
(for these projects, all interactions may be counted in 
hindsight as unnecessary costs) and 
Figure 1   Two separate PLCs with interaction points 
between them 
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 The cost of too few interactions for the "unlucky" 
projects, in which conflicts between requirements and 
unsatisfactory design trade-off are recognised late, 
requiring expensive rework or causing project 
failures. For these projects, frequent interaction 
points would save money by reducing rework.  
The standards tend to identify static interaction points, 
partially through the very nature of the standard as a static 
text. But the potential improvements through dynamic 
interaction points are significant. Pre-planned, statically 
scheduled interaction points are akin to scheduled 
maintenance of equipment: they happen at predictable 
times, their cost is factored into the total cost from the 
beginning, and they are frequent enough to avoid nasty 
surprises. However, a regime of scheduled maintenance 
does not necessarily avoid ALL surprises and there is a 
need to have a design that can deal with failures occurring 
between maintenance points. If components of a system 
fail during operation, the system typically needs: means 
for failure detection; means for diagnosis; means for 
repair or reconfiguration, recovery and restart. In the 
case of the co-engineered lifecycle, examples of failures 
and their detection mechanisms might be the following: 
 Initial requirements from a client are found to be in 
conflict during the implementation phase (for 
instance encryption of data for a particular security 
standard takes too much time to meet a performance 
requirement). This may trigger interaction points in 
the current phase of the PLC, and/or in previous 
phases (that is, undoing some refinement activity for 
some system part, going back to change and re-
analyse a higher-level design, so as to make the 
satisfaction of the requirements feasible; or even 
going back to renegotiate these requirements). 
 Inadequate performance may lead to a safety related 
issue. For example, a machine vision component in 
an automated system may turn out to be insufficiently 
robust to adequately recognize a sufficiently large set 
of risky scenarios and may need to be upgraded for 
performance. The introduction of new, redundant 
mechanisms to deliver the needed performance might 
open up a new attack surface that was previously 
unanalysed. 
 in the process of refining an aspect of design, the 
design team discovers that they violated some 
'contract' established at a previous stage of refinement 
(e.g., they agreed to implement a certain message 
encryption as a security control in less than a certain 
fraction of the main control loop period of a system; 
but they discover that when implemented it takes 
longer). 
 the safety specialists realise that they may have 
missed out something important in communicating 
their proposed architecture to the security team; so, 
the analysis by the latter that gave the 'all clear' to the 
architecture may be wrong. 
 independently of an on-going development effort (or, 
alternatively, after deployment), a new vulnerability 
has been discovered in a component or algorithm. 
The security team wishes therefore to introduce new 
controls, which might violate some assumption made 
by the other teams (e.g. about timing, or about 
possibility of communication between two 
components, or authority given to a component) on 
the basis of the currently specified controls. 
In all these cases, the "detection" amounts to some team 
member becoming aware of something potentially being 
wrong. Triggering an interaction point (possibly delayed, 
just as responsive maintenance can be delayed) then 
serves to perform diagnosis: to decide whether something 
is indeed wrong, possibly through intermediate steps of 
more extensive analysis. The interaction point may in turn 
trigger more extensive analyses (e.g., if our trust that a 
deadline would not be violated was built simply on 
extensive statistics of the delays observed in off-line 
testing, it may trigger another similar round of offline 
testing), just for the purpose of reaching a diagnosis, and 
then possibly some rework/redesign, again possibly 
requiring new analyses on the redesigned system. 
Analyses of the results of the rework/redesign would be 
subjected to another interaction point, to check that 
indeed the problem is resolved. The combination of 
statically scheduled interaction points and dynamically 
scheduled ones might prove more cost-effective than a 
more frequent series of statically scheduled ones.  
3   System Design vs. Safety/Security/ 
Performance Analyses 
The evolution of the system through the PLC is captured 
by models, chosen by the developers. In AQUAS the 
system models of most of the demonstrators will be based 
on the OMG SysML/UML formalisms. A significant part 
of it may be created directly from these models, including 
by e.g. automatic code generation. Should the system be 
changed (e.g. fixing faults/vulnerabilities in development 
or post-deployment), the system model will be modified 
too, so that the “real system” and the model of it are kept 
consistent throughout the phases of the PLC. 
Assurance about the required non-functional properties of 
the designed system is achieved by dedicated methods of 
analysis (i.e., Safety, Security, Performance – SSP 
analysis), focused on assessing whether the system has 
the required non-functional properties or not. Each one of 
the various methods used for analysing security, safety 
and/or performance relies on its own models. In some 
cases, these models coincide with parts of the design 
documentation: e.g., some verification methods are 
applied directly to source code or to state machine 
diagrams used in specifications. But for many SSP 
analyses, the models they need rely on formalisms that are 
very different from SysML/UML. E.g., performance 
modelling might use Petri nets or queuing networks. The 
important point here is that whenever an SSP analysis is 
needed, a model suitable for it must be extracted or 
derived from the model of the designed system, available 
at that particular point in time. Two further important 
points are worth making here: 
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 Some methods of analysis (and their respective 
models) may not be applicable at all before the 
system model has matured enough (e.g. a tool might 
need the availability of source code for analysis). 
 Some analyses may ignore some details of the 
designed system even if such details are available. 
For instance, if one uses a probabilistic state-based 
model such as Stochastic Petri Nets (SPN) one may 
be unable to benefit fully from having the full source 
code of the designed product. 
 The design models or design documentation are 
normally incomplete descriptions. For instance, 
designers may specify the type of a microcontroller 
or memory chip to use in the system, and so to 
facilitate verification, appropriate data sheets for 
these products can be used. But implementation 
details inside these components may have major 
effects on non-functional properties. E.g., chip mask 
changes may have undocumented performance 
implications, or add/remove design faults; the much 
publicised "Spectre" and "Meltdown" vulnerabilities 
result from vendor-controlled chip design details that 
a system designer would typically ignore; and the 
new security/performance trade-offs required by the 
fixes for these vulnerabilities were arranged by 
vendors with limited communication to users. So, 
analyses for security, safety etc. may require adding 
extensive "annexes" to system design documentation. 
4   Tool Support 
Interaction points occur within the context of a number of 
questions: 
 Why an interaction point would be needed (e.g. a 
potential conflict may arise) 
 When an interaction point should take place (e.g. 
statically or dynamically determined) 
 What will take place during the interaction point (e.g. 
joint examination of a design artefact, trade-off 
analysis of conflicting design decisions) 
 How it will take place (e.g. manual observation and 
discussion, automated tool support, semi-automated 
tool support) 
As challenging as the first two questions are, it is equally 
challenging to address the second two questions. That is, 
when an interaction point does occur, there must be a 
viable set of artefacts (at whatever level of abstraction or 
lifecycle phase) available. 
 What. The procedures of e.g. the security and safety 
analysts can be run independently without difficulty. 
But they may use different models that are difficult to 
relate to each other; or, simply, the kind of questions 
that need to be asked to identity gaps left by the 
independent analyses are non-obvious. Or e.g. the 
security analyst may propose a design addition – a 
subsystem implementing a security control, but 
specify it in a formalism that makes it hard for the 
other specialists to analyse. This may create practical 
difficulties that make a complete analysis too onerous 
in practice. 
 How. Even if two artefacts have been created with the 
same formalism (e.g. SysML), there may be a lack of 
adequate tools to support the needed analyses (e.g. 
tools for worst-case performance analysis). More 
critically, even if the tools are individually available, 
they may not be able to interact due to poor planning 
of the overall toolchain framework. 
Efficiency of interaction is also an important factor here. 
People might limit themselves to simpler analyses if it is 
too time/effort-consuming to do deeper analyses, such as 
the combined analyses for SSP. Inadequate tool 
interoperability and inconsistencies of modelling 
formalisms can severely hamper efficiency, but they can 
be addressed through emerging interoperability standards. 
In the end, tool interoperability and judicious automation 
will improve not only the economics of the work, but also 
the quality of the result. 
   
